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IMPROVING THE SAFETY AND EFFICIENCY OF
FOREIGN ADOPTIONS:
U.S. DOMESTIC ADOPTION PROGRAMS AND
ADOPTION PROGRAMS IN OTHER COUNTRIES
PROVIDE LESSONS FOR INS REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
Intercountry adoption (ICA) is the adoption of a child of one national-
ity by a parent or parents of another. From 1968-1986, the number of ICAs
grew steadily at a rate of 11% per year, reaching about 10,000 in 1986. That
number has leveled in the past decade to just over 9,000 in 1991, and 8,200
in 1994.1 As China and Russia (two major sources of adoptees or "sending
countries") open their doors to foreign adoptions, however, the numbers are
likely to increase.2
Interest in ICAs has grown considerably in the last twenty years.
While earlier in this century most adoptions were motivated by the desire to
help a child out of a tragic situation, many couples in the 1990's look to
adoption as a way to start a family.3 A rising infertility rate and an increased
acceptance of single mothers have contributed to the growing demand for
foreign adoptions. In addition, many adoption agencies have responded to the
shortage of domestic babies by limiting their services to married couples
without children.4 This move has drastically restricted domestic adoption as
an option to prospective parents who are single, older, or already have a
family.
Today, there are many needy foreign children and loving prospective
parents for whom adoption would be a positive step. Yet, against this
backdrop, Table I demonstrates that the number of ICAs has stagnated in the
past five years. One reason for this stagnation is that many sending countries
'1993 STAT. Y.B. (Immigration and Naturalization Service) 32, 51 (1994) [hereinafter
"1993 INS Statistical Yearbook"]. The 1994 statistic is a preliminary figure. Telephone
Interview with Michael Hoefner, Immigration and Naturalization Service (Apr. 3, 1995)
[hereinafter "Hoefier Interview"].
2 Telephone Interview with Mark Eckman, Staff Attorney, Datz Foundation (Apr. 3, 1995)
[hereinafter "Eckman Interview"].
3 Mary C. Hester, Comment, Intercountry Adoption from a Louisiana Perspective, 53 LA.
L. Rv. 1271, 1272 (1993).
4 Susann M. Bisignaro, Comment, Intercountry Adoption Today and the Implications of
the 1993 Hague Convention on Tomorrow, 13 DICK. J. INT'LL. 123, 124 (1994).
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have closed their doors to foreign adoption out of a fear of baby-selling and
other abuses. In addition, administrative bottlenecks in the United States
have restricted entry visas for adoptees. The law now stands at a crossroads,
and the challenge is to balance growing demand for ICAs with careful
protection of each party's interests.
The United States is by far the largest receiving country of ICAs, and
should take the lead in restoring trust in this process so that more sending
countries do not halt or curtail ICAs. Through the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (hereinafter INS), the agency that oversees ICAs, the federal
government should also streamline its partnership with the states in process-
ing foreign adoptions so that more prospective parents and children can be
brought together.
The best models for reform of the federal ICA program are those that
are already in place: U.S. state adoption laws and the ICA programs in other
industrialized countries. These programs have evolved to regulate adoptions,
and can be evaluated on their merits and operating history.
This note begins by discussing generally why ICA programs should
be reformed rather than abandoned in the current climate of fear of abuses and
frustration with delays. Then, the note examines three adoption programs:
U.S. state domestic adoption programs, the current INS systems for foreign
adoptions, and the Hague Convention proposals. Finally, evaluation of these
models leads to specific suggestions on how to prevent abuse and improve the
efficiency of ICAs in the United States by reform at the INS level.
Table 1 - ICAs in the United States 1986-19946
1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994
9945 10097 9120 7948 7088 9008 6536 7348 8200
Table 2 -Limits or Bans on ICAs in Major Sending Countries 1985-1995
1995: Costa Rica7 - adoption agencies report ICA process has stalled
5 See Table 2 -Restrictions and Bans on ICAs in Major Sending Countries.
6 1993 INS Statistical Yearbook at 32. The 1994 figure is preliminary.
7 Eckman Interview, supra note 2.
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Russia' - parliament approves new controls on ICAs by
unanimous vote
1994: Guatemala9 - widespread threats against U.S. citizens engaged in
ICA process
Ukraine1" - unanimous parliamentary vote to suspend ICAs
1993: Bosnia" - suspended ICAs for the duration of the war
People's Republic of China12 - suspended ICAs
Romania13 - expanded bureaucratic procedures virtually halt ICAs
1992: Albania - suspended ICAs4
1991: Brazil 5 - strict new ICA law
1988: South Korea 16 - set goal of eliminating ICAs by the year 2000
1987: Haiti17 - suspended ICAs
Sri Lanka18 - suspended ICAs
81NS, State Dept. Instruct on New Russian Adoption Law, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES 332
(Mar. 6, 1995).
9 INS cable file HQ 204.22-C (May 4, 1994), reprinted in 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 835
(June 27, 1994).
10 INSAdvises on Ukrainian Adoptions, 70 INTERPRETER RELEASES 977 (July 26, 1993).
11 Jim Muir & Tessa Boase, 1TN Reporter Fights Bosnia Over Child He Smuggled Out,
DAILY TELEGRAPH (LoNDoN), May 30, 1994, at 5.12 1NS Provides Guidance on Updating China Adoption Applications, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 1642 (Dec. 13, 1993).
13 Mary Ann Candelario McMillan, International Adoption: A Step Towards a Uniform
Process, 5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 137, 143-44 (1993).14 NSAnnounces Suspension ofAlbanian Adoptions, 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 566 (Apr.
25, 1994).
" McMillan, at 141.16 Korea Eases Way for Foreign Adoptions, But End Near, Los ANGELES TIMES, Apr. 17,
1994, at 2.17 H616ne Gaudemet-Tallon, Le Droi; Francais de L 'Adoption Internationale, 42 REvuE
INTERNATIONALE DE DROrr COMPARE 567, 570 (1990).
18 id.
1995]
36 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
II. THE ROLE OF INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION
Even though the demographics of childless families in the United
States and needy children overseas would support having an ICA system,
some opponents question its legitimacy. They balk at the idea of moving
children around the world, and are skeptical of the ability of governments to
prevent ICAs from turning into a "market" in children. Specifically, ICA
opponents argue that: (1) babies should only be placed domestically; (2) the
United States should not waste resources on foreign children; and, most
importantly, (3) foreign adoptions allow baby-selling. This section of the
note addresses these concerns and defends the process of intercountry
adoption.
Opponents of ICAs argue that orphans deserve placement in their
own country with parents of their same ethnicity. Critics have cast doubt on
the humanitarian nature of international adoption by focusing on the child's
break with his or her native culture and ethnic heritage. This source of
opposition has hit hard in England, leading to a serious resistance to
government-sponsored ICAs.'9 In fact, a recent editorial in a leading British
newspaper condemned parents who adopt children from abroad as arrogant
and racist.2" Similarly, a self-help guide for prospective parents labels
Canadian officials as unhelpful because of their reservations about the ethics
of intercountry adoptions."
In the United States, adoption workers are split on the propriety of
interracial adoptions, including ICAs.2  State adoption laws generally bely a
19 Jeremy Laurance, Over 40's Encouraged to Adopt, TIMEs (LONDON), Nov. 4, 1993.
There were only about 50 officially-recognized ICAs in England annually before 1990. The
unofficial total, however, was probably much higher. Rosie Waterhouse, Despairing Search
That Drives People to Illegality Abroad, INDEPENDENT (LONDON), Oct. 15, 1994, at 3.
20 Referring to the recent highly publicized case of a British couple who circumvented
Romanian laws to adopt a baby girl, the author wrote that "the case and its coverage reveals an
extraordinary set of assumptions. Primarily that poor countries do not have the right to protect
themselves from those from the rich half of the world and that these people have acquired
exemption from moral and legal accountability simply because they are better off." Tradingin
Babies, GUARDIAN (LONDON), Oct. 27, 1994, at 13.
21 JOHN BOWEN, ACANADIAN GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL ADOPTIONS, xvi (1992).
22 Interestingly, most adoption workers in the late 1960's considered interracial adoptions
a positive force in promoting integration. A 1972 speech by the president of the National
Association of Black Social Workers (NABSW) ended this exuberance. Speaking before a
group of mostly white parents who had adopted black children, he accused the audience of
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preference for placing children with parents of the same ethnicity or race. The
U.S. Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978, 25 U.S.C. §1901 (1988), also
expresses a preference for Native American adoptive parents (although the
Act allows adoption out to any family that can provide a good home in the
best interests of the child). This trend has not significantly affected the ability
of foreign adoptees to find placement in the United States, but concern about
interracial adoptions could become a major hurdle to a successful ICA system.
Despite these concerns, domestic placement is often not a realistic
option. The children who would most benefit from ICAs come from countries
such as Russia or Guatemala which have severe economic problems, or from
countries ravaged by the drug trade, such as Colombia.23 As one author wrote
recently, "[A]lthough the United Nations (U.N.) has expressly established
rights for children, the economic and political realities of their native countries
deprive these children of such basic rights."24 For example:
- Over 1,000 homeless children (out of seven million total) die each year in
Brazil at the hands of hired guns who protect stores from looting.25
- In South Korea, a Confucian ethic that place a higher value upon blood
lineage makes adopted children second-class citizens.26
- In parts of Uganda hit hard by the AIDS epidemic, an estimated 25% of
children have lost both parents.27
-A 1989 report found that up to one half of children in Romanian orphanages
did not survive the winter, often due to lack of heat, running water or sewage
facilities.28
"cultural genocide." Stephanie Sue Padilla, Note, Adoption ofAlien Orphan Children: How
U.S. Immigration Law Defines Family, 7 Geo. Immigr. L. J. 817, 822 (1993). Opinions on
interracial adoptions today are polarized: "it all depends on where you are and whom you ask."
Adoption forBlack Children: A Case Study of Expert Discretion, in I RESEARCH IN LAW AND
SocioLoGy 265, 294 (1978).
23 1993 INS Statistical Yearbook, supra note 1, at 51.24 Margaret Liu, InternationalAdoptions: An Overview, 8 TEMP. II, T'L & COMP. L. J. 187,
189 (1994).
25Id. at 187.
26 Id. at 188.
27Id. at 188-89.
28 Hester, supra note 3, at 1273.
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- One Hong Kong official noted that "overseas adoption is a lifeline for Hong
Kong's special needs children."29
Similar stories appear in almost every country, emphasizing the need for
ICAs.
In addition, many children adopted abroad come from an ethnic or
racial group on the lowest rung of the social ladder. For example, a signifi-
cant number of the children adopted from Brazil are black, many from
Spanish-speaking South America are Indian or mixed-blood ("mestizo"), and
a significant number from India are very dark-skinned.3" Opportunities in
their native countries can be severely limited by their heritage or skin color, a
fate from which the United States has traditionally offered an alternative.3
Thus, while ICAs might not be necessary in an ideal world, many children
come from less than ideal situations. Intercountry adoptions offer hope in
cases where domestic placement is not a viable option.32
Some opponents of foreign adoptions argue that the United States has
no obligation to foreign children and should not use limited domestic re-
sources to care for them. Fewer than 10,000 foreign adoptees enter the United
States annually, however. This represents a minute percentage of total
immigration-only approximately one percent.33 Also, careful checks on the
adoptive parents' finances will prevent these children from becoming public
charges. Moreover, since most adoptees are infants and young children, they
are unlikely to engage in criminal activity or take jobs from U.S. citizens.
Rather, ICAs are an important alternative for U.S. citizens who are unable to
have their own children.
The third and most politically damaging argument against ICAs is
that they allegedly allow baby-selling. Charges of baby-selling have led to
drastic curtailment of ICAs in some countries, including a strict new adoption
act passed in Brazil in 1991, and expanded bureaucratic procedures in
Romania that have made foreign adoptions there almost impossible. The
29 Trans-RacialAdoption, ECONOMIST, May 14, 1994, at 12.
30 Hester, supra note 3, at 1273.
31 Similarly, while Gypsies make up less than 15% of Romania's population, half of all
children in orphanages are Gypsies. Nick Thorpe, Hope and Love Struggle to Prevail in Land
of Orphans, THE OBSERVER (LONDON), Dec. 26, 1993, at 7.32 Liu, supra note 24, at 193-94.
33 1993 INS Statistical Yearbook, supra note 1, at 32.
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extent of baby-selling cannot be easily determined because it is difficult to
distinguish between innocent cash payments to intermediaries or government
officials, and a true illicit market for infants. However, the media has found
some instances of baby-selling and made the most of them. Consider, for
example, the following first-hand account of the adoption scene in Romania:
"By the time I reached Bucharest in February 1991 ... the collision of West
bloc wealth and East bloc poverty had created a burgeoning black market in
babies, and every potential adopter had to find his or her own moral footing
in a sordid and complex situation. It would take me weeks to realize that little
of what I was asked to do to obtain a child sat easy on my conscience."34 The
details of many of these reports make them very believable.
Tragically, there are nearly seven million homeless children in Brazil,
and some 200,000 orphans in Romania (as a result of the Ceausescu days of
encouraging population growth by prohibiting contraception and abortion).
Adoption is not a possibility for most of these children because of limits on
foreign adoptions imposed by their own governments.
ICAs should not end because of concerns about baby-selling. Rather,
receiving countries must develop stronger controls based on respect for the
laws of sending countries and the best interest of the child. The United States
can dramatically reduce the risk of baby-selling by reforming the current ICA
system. Since most sending countries are inherently strained in their ability to
police adoptions, the INS and the states must carefully verify the legality of all
ICAs.35
34 Lee Aitken, The High Price of a Baby's Love, MONEY, Jan. 1, 1992, at 98. The same
description of Romania continues with a series of increasingly bizarre stories:
[I] quickly encountered the whole range of adoption entrepreneurs: the driver-
translators who charged a day rate to help you scour the countryside; the high-tech
baby finders with answering machines and faxes who paid doctors as tipsters and
charged a flat fee of $3,000 or $4,000 per baby.. ., the lawyers who could produce
children mysteriously for even more money than that, though the actual legal process
of adoption cost about $6. Id. at 100, 103. At one hotel, an American woman was
brokering $6,000 babies out of a suite--an operation I called Babies in a Box. Id. at
Ill.
These stories have blanketed the world's press over the past few years, and have
caused real concern about human rights, child abuse, and a lack of respect for
developing countries. Some authors have termed ICAs a "new form of colonialism,"
whereby industrial countries exploit children as a natural resource. Liu, supra note
24, at 194-95.
35 One author describes three interrelated reasons why sending countries cannot adequately
police foreign adoptions. Bowen, supra note 21, at 4. First, acts that may seem unethical or
unlikely to a prospective parent in a wealthy country may be appropriate and common in an
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Overall, foreign adoptions serve a fundamental goal of U.S. immigra-
tion policy. Like the refugee programs, ICAs offer hope to children who have
little opportunity to improve their situation, or to escape possibly life-threat-
ening conditions.
III. STATE, FEDERAL, AND INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION
PROGRAMS: MODELS FOR REFORM?
Before considering specific reforms of the current U.S. program, this
note will describe current state, federal, and international adoption programs.
First, state adoption programs offer important lessons for reform of the
federal system. Consequently, the INS should shift some of the responsibility
for intercountry adoptions to the states. Second, current INS regulations
should be amended. The Service coordinates all foreign adoptions in the
United States, and basic reforms would create a safer, more efficient system.
Third, the Hague Convention, which has been the most common suggestion
for ICA reform in the past two years, has many weaknesses that make it an
incomplete remedy.
a. Domestic Adoptions Administered by the States
Most Americans would be surprised to learn that adoption developed
only recently in domestic family law. As a common law country, the United
States imported its case law from England, where legal rights and relation-
ships were defined by blood in order to protect the landed aristocracy.36 As
one author wrote earlier this century, "[T]he English had an inordinately high
regard for blood lineage and consequently the practice of adoption never
acquired a foothold there."37 Adoption did not enter English statutory law
underdeveloped country (the so-called "relative plight phenomenon"). Second, lack of a well-
functioning legal system can lead to systematic governmental corruption. Third, U.S. dollars
may exert excessive influence on biological parents and intermediaries in countries where the
currency has very little relative value ("empowerment of wealth"). Id. at 5.
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until 1926.3s Except for those states with some civil law heritage (such as
Louisiana and Texas), most did not recognize adoption until the early 20th
century.
39
As domestic adoption programs developed, the common law preoccu-
pation with property rights became secondary to public sympathy for aban-
doned children.' From these origins came the American emphasis upon "best
interest of the child," an amorphous balancing test applied today in a variety
of family law contexts. The "factors involved in determining the best interest
of a child are not capable of specification; rather, each case must be decided
on its own facts and circumstances."' Those factors generally include race,
religion, continuity of residence, financial history, degree of bonding, and
potential harm to the child.42 As early as 1935, the best interest test was
being implemented in the form of investigations of the parties before finaliza-
tion of a domestic adoption.43
Today, adoption is firmly established in every U.S. state, and the
federal government encourages adoption through two statutes.44 All states
have signed the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, which
establishes an office in each state to coordinate adoptions.4 ' Like most family
law issues, authority over adoptions has settled with the individual states,
many of which have a sophisticated adoption statute and program.4 6
38 Pedro F. Silva-Ruiz, Intrastate and Intercountry Adoption in the United States, 38 Am.
J. COMP. L. 153 (1990).39 Huard, supra note 36, at 747, 748. Maryland passed the first adoption act in the United
States in 1892. WAGGONERETAL, FAMILY PROPERTY LAW 123 (1991).40 Huard, supra note 36 at 748.41 In re A.V.D., 815 P.2d 277,282 (Wash. 1991).
42 Some authors have suggested changing the name of the test to the "least detrimental
alternative" test, which reflects the reality that there is often not one definable best interest for
the child. Maria E. Selmann, For the Sake of the Child: Moving Toward Uniformity in
Adoption Law, 69 WASH. L. REV. 841, 844, (1994), citing JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ANNA FREUD,
AND ALBERT J. SOLNIT, BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD (1979).43 Huard, supra note 36, at 749.
44 Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C. § 620 (1988) (federal
funds provided for certain approved state adoption plans); Child Abuse Prevention and
Treatment and Adoption Reform Act, 42 U.S.C. § 5111 (1988) (calls for providing homes for
children and eliminating barriers to adoption).
45 For a review of the Interstate Compact on the Placement of Children, see 2 AM. JuR. 2D
Adoption § 28 (1994).6 An adoption is a completely statutorily-created legal relationship. As one court wrote,
adoptions should "find homes for children, not find children for families." In re Harshey, 341
N.E.2d 616, 619 (Ohio 1975). The court continued: "[S]uch a purpose is laudatory for it
places the best interests of the child above the desires and needs of the adoptive parents." Id.
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A domestic adoption typically consists of two steps: termination of
the natural parents' rights and the subsequent vesting of custody with the
adoptive parents. These steps are distinct, and are often separated by the fact
that custody over the child will pass through an agency and then to the
adoptive parent.47
State adoption laws are not uniform, despite attempts to make them
so. 48 Only five states have passed the revised Uniform Adoption Act of
1969.4' However, many aspects of domestic adoptions serve as good models
for an ICA program, including the consent of the biological parents, the need
for counseling, and a focus on the best interest of the child. In addition, most
states ban consideration for adoptions beyond expenses incurred, and attach
criminal penalties to violations. Further, many also require abandonment or
consent to relinquishment by the natural parents be a willful, positive act.
b. INS Policy on Foreign Adoptions
A brief discussion of the history and current structure of the INS
program will serve as a useful basis for evaluating INS reform.
Like state adoption programs, the INS regulations on intercountry
adoptions were a humanitarian response to a social problem. Following the
Second World War, large numbers of European refugees came to the United
States, including many children and infants legally classified as "homeless" or
"parentless" under the Displaced Persons Act of 1948. 50 Since then, inter-
country adoptions have been driven by wars, natural disasters, and economic
depressions that have left children literally out in the cold. Other waves of
at 616. In other words, the adoption process should be liberally construed to protect the best
interest of the child, particularly since the adoptive parents have no basic right to the child. 2
AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 12 (1994).47 See In re Baby Boy M, 221 Cal. App. 3d 475, 478 (1990)(dictum)(relinquishing legal
custody of a child to a licensed adoption agency can only be withdrawn by mutual agreement).
48 California, for example, has a relatively long wait for adoption processing and easier
revocation by the birth mother. Alternatively, Texas provides for a more expedited process and
irrevocable consent, and requires payments to help the birth mother. Selmann, supra note 42,
at 847. Among the most controversial areas of state adoption law and policy are: (1) the
propriety of interracial adoptions; (2) whether to allow open adoptions (with full knowledge by
the child of his or her birth mother); and (3) the degree of consent required of the biological
father. Id. at 855.
49 A new Uniform Adoption Act is in the final draft stage. Id. at 842.50 Pub. L. No. 80-774, 62 Stat. 1009 (1948). See also 59 Fed. Reg. 38,877 (1994).
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ICAs came after the Korean and Vietnam wars.51 Just as the United States led
common law countries in developing domestic adoption practices, it also
quickly emerged as the largest receiver of foreign adoptees.52
U.S. law provides two ways to adopt a foreign child.53 First, the child
may qualify for direct adoption if he or she has lived with the prospective U.S.
citizen parent(s) for at least two years.54 This generally applies to American
families living overseas, and occasionally to parents located in the United
States who have taken in an undocumented alien.55
Second, and by far the more common situation, involves American
parents who want to adopt a child from abroad but who have no direct link to
the child. In this process, the INS plays the middleman among the various
interests involved: the foreign government; the adoption agency; the U.S.
state government; the U.S. federal government; the prospective parent(s); the
biological parent(s); and the adoptee. The INS checks whether the prospec-
tive parents would provide a suitable home, and whether the biological
parents, if any, have truly consented to the child's adoption abroad.56 In these
roles, the INS bolsters the work of the U.S. state or foreign country, creating
a stronger protective web for the child.
The first step in the adoption process is usually the evaluation of the
prospective parents, which can be done even before a child has been identi-
fied. Prospective parents must submit INS Form I-600A and are also subject
to a home study based on a personal interview, home visit, and assessment of
parenting ability and living conditions.57 If the INS approves the form and the
home study, called preprocessing, then the prospective parents must document
that the child is an orphan.58 This step may include written and witnessed
consent of the biological parents.
51 Liu, supra note 24, at 192.
52 Margarette Driscoll, y Was It So Hard to Give Chica a Loving Home?, SUNDAY TIMES
(London), July 24, 1994, at 13.
53 ICA law is covered generally by 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101, 1151-54, 1434; 8 C.F.R. § 204.1-3
(1994). See generally, H. Wayne Elliott, International Adoptions: Step by Step, 6 S.C. L.
REv. 37 (1995).54 INA § 101(b)(1)(E), 8 U.S.C. § 1 10l(b)(1)(E).
15 Elizabeth Bartholet; International Adoption: Overview in ADOPTION LAW AND PRACTICE
§ 11.03[3][c] (Joan Hollinger, ed. 1991). Adoptions of this type involve Form 1-130 rather than
the standard ICA Form 1-600.
56 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(d).
17Id. at § 204.3(e).58 The INS will also require state pre'processing, if the state involved has such a procedure.
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One major problem with the INS system is that the Immigration and
Nationality Act (INA) contains no visa category for "adoptees." Rather, a
foreign adopted child can only obtain a visa to enter the United States if he or
she can be classified as an "orphan."59 This requirement dates back to the
post-World War II era, when most children were in fact parentless. The INS
defines an orphan as one whose:
A) sole or surviving parent is incapable of providing for the orphan's care and
has irrevocably released the orphan for emigration and adoption, or
B) parents have both died, disappeared, abandoned the child, or have been
permanently separated from the child.6"
As discussed below, this definition is deceptively restrictive and
limits the number of ICAs in the United States.
The INS attempted a general reform of its ICA program through
revised adoption regulations in October 1994, including an expansion of the
meaning of certain words in the orphan definition.6 However, the current INS
system still limits the number of foreign adoptions without providing ade-
quate safeguards against abuses. Specific proposals for reform of the INS
regulations, based on the lessons learned from evaluating state programs, can
help improve the quality of the ICA system in the United States.
c. Hague Convention of 1993
Various international conventions have attempted to control the ICA
process, but until recently all have stopped short of establishing true regula-
tory programs. The Hague Convention on Intercountry Adoption,6" completed
in 1993 and presently signed by fourteen countries, goes a step further with
concrete suggestions on how each participating country should structure its
59 A "child who meets the definition of orphan ... is eligible for classification as the
immediate relative of a U.S. citizen." 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(a)(2) (1994).
60 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(d)(1)(A),(B),(C); INA § 101(b)(1)(F) (1994).
61 59 Fed. Reg. 38,876 (1994).
62 Hague Convention on Private International Law: Final Act of the 17th Session, Including
the Convention on Protection of Children and Co-operation in Respect of Intercountry
Adoption, reprinted in 32 I.L.M. 1134 (1993) [hereinafter "Hague Convention" or
"Convention"].
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foreign adoption scheme.63 Most importantly, the Convention calls for
worldwide recognition of ICAs as a viable alternative for child placement.64
In addition, the Convention requires each signatory country to set up a
"Central Authority" to coordinate ICAs.65 These authorities would process
foreign adoptions in conjunction with their international counterparts, license
domestic adoption agencies, and generally police the system.
The Hague Convention is a step forward in international ICA
regulation and provides a basic model for intergovernmental cooperation
through the various state Central Authorities. A number of commentators
have reviewed the Convention, and they generally favor its ratification by the
United States.' However, the Convention has several major weaknesses that
make it inadequate as an overall model for reform.
One weakness is that implementation is left largely to the participat-
ing countries, with only general guidance on how to structure the program and
prevent abuse. For example, the Convention calls for "competent authorities"
to take "all appropriate measures" to prevent baby-selling.67 The treaty lacks
sufficient details to guide countries toward compliance. Furthermore, as yet
no country has ratified the treaty.6" Therefore, even if all countries were
theoretically able to carry out their designated role under the Convention, no
country has agreed to do so.
Perhaps the greatest flaw of the Convention is its reliance upon
Central Authorities in the sending countries to prevent abuses. Many of these
63 Bisignaro, supra note 4, at 139.
64 Hague Convention, supra note 62, at 32 I.L.M. 1139.
651 d., Art. 6, at 32 I.L.M. 1140.
66 The Convention is discussed in depth in Bisignaro, supra note 4; Lisa M. Katz, A Modest
Proposal? The Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of
Intercountry Adoption, 9 EMORY INT'L L. REv. 283 (1995) (Convention is only a start in
reforming ICA system worldwide); Holly C. Kennard, Curtailing the Sale and Trafficking of
Children: A Discussion of the Hague Conference in Respect ofintercountry Adoption, 14 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 623 (1994); Mary Ann Candelario McMillan, International Adoption: A
Step Towards a Uniform Process, 5 PACE INT'L L. REv. 137 (1993) (U.S. should ratify the
Convention because coordinated international system would be preferable to inconsistent U.S.
state laws); Padilla, supra note 22; Peter H. Pfund, Intercountry Adoption: The 1993 Hague
Convention: Its Purpose Implementation, and Promise, 28 FAM. L. Q. 53 (1994) (U.S. should
amend INA to adopt Convention); Kristina Wilken, Defining Family: Adoption Law and
Policy, 2 DUKE J. GENDER L. & POL'Y 85 (1995).67
"Hague Convention Art. 4, supra note 62, at 32 I.L.M. 1139, 1140.68 Bisignaro, supra note 4, at 139. The 1994 INS regulations explicitly distance the Service
from the Hague Convention, making it unclear when the United States will ratify the treaty. 59
Fed. Reg. 38, 877 (1994).
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countries are in turmoil due to war or economic disaster, and may not be able
to adequately police ICAs. In fact, many of the sending countries that have
banned ICAs did so because they were unable to effectively control the
process. 69  Canada provides one example of a Central Authority that has
failed to work because of instability in sending countries. The Canadian
government has established a National Adoption Desk (NAD) to coordinate
ICAs and enter into agreements with foreign countries to facilitate
adoptions.7" Despite this national effort to encourage ICAs, there were less
than 400 adoptions processed through the NAD between 1987 and 1992."'
After interviewing adoption workers, one author wrote that the failure of this
system is due to difficulties in relying on bilateral agreements with certain
foreign sending countries.7
2
Therefore, the Hague Convention falls short of being a workable
model for reform of the U.S. system, despite the fact that it appears to be one
of the most popular options. While the Convention represents an important
step forward in the slow process of fostering international cooperation on
ICAs, reform should take place through the existing INS program, using U.S.
state domestic adoption programs as a model.
IV. ANALYSIS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM
ICAs are an important option for U.S. citizens trying to start a family
and for foreign children whose parents cannot care for them. The following
section will describe: (1) why reform can best be achieved at the INS level;
(2) how abuses of the system can be prevented; and (3) how the efficiency of
the process can be improved. Where possible, examples from domestic
adoption programs and ICA programs in other developed countries will be
used.
a. Why reform at the INS level?
Reform can be best effectuated through the agency that links all
69 See Table II, supra.
70 Bowen, supra note 21, at 24. The province of Ontario has established direct links with
thirteen countries through the NAD. Id. at 27.7 1 ld. at 68.
72 id.
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interested parties. As one author recently wrote, "[a]midst the turbulent and
seemingly unnavigable sea of foreign and state law, there remains one
constant: U.S. immigration and naturalization law."73
In one respect, reform at the INS level appears counterintuitive. If
American states evaluate prospective parents, and foreign officials assess the
biological parents' consent, then the governmental body with the greatest
access to evidence and documents would be managing each part of the
adoption.74 However, there are two reasons why the INS must remain
involved in the process. First, the INS must be involved because of its control
over immigrant visas. Second, the INS has already taken an active lead in
intercountry adoptions and developed considerable experience and expertise
in the area. Therefore, the most practical way to reform the ICA process is
by making the INS a more effective and responsible coordinator of the various
interests involved.
b. How to prevent abuse of the ICA process
In addition to focusing world attention on the plight of orphans
(which sending countries often resent), the world press has latched on to some
egregious cases of baby-selling to impugn the entire ICA process." A recent
case in Israel featured "Baby Caroline," who was legally adopted from Brazil
but consequently was taken from her adoptive parents after press reports that
she had been kidnapped.76 Similarly, a recent INS cable stated: "threats have
been made against U.S. citizens in Guatemala as a result of rumors about U.S.
citizens allegedly involved in the abduction, abuse and killing of Guatemalan
children.... [Americans there should] avoid unnecessary public appearances
with Guatemalan children." '77 This concern over U.S. citizens "stealing"
73 Liu, supra note 24, at 205.
74 Hester, supra note 3, at 1307. The Hague Convention also calls for a reduced INS role:
"If the United States ratifies the International Convention on Intercountry Adoption [Hague
Convention], the INS will no longer have to scrutinize the child or the adoptive parents because
the Central Authorities will provide this service." Padilla, supra note 22, at 844.
75 D. Kokkini-Iatridou, L'Adoption en Droit International Prive Neerlandais, in
NETHERLANDS REPORTS TO THE 13TH INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIvE LAW 100,
102 (1990).
76 Pinkas Shifinan, International Adoptions, in ISRAELI REPORTS TO THE 13TH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIvE LAW 35 (1990).
77 INS cable file HQ 204.22-C (May 4, 1994), reprinted in 71 INTERPRETER RELEASES 835
(June 27, 1994).
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children from poorer countries resonates with the history of colonialism in
many of the sending countries."
To counter this bad press, the INS must strive to prevent abuse of the
ICA process. An evaluation of state and foreign adoption programs provides
five suggestions for making ICAs less open to charges of abuse:
1) require that ICAs be processed by licensed non-profit agencies;
2) ban money payments except for direct adoption expenses;
3) impose strict penalties for violation of INS regulations;
4) evaluate the best interest of the child in difficult cases; and
5) mandate home country physical examinations for adoptees.
Each of these suggestions is discussed in turn below.
i) Ban non-agency ICAs. Non-agency ICAs should be eliminated.79
The difficulty of regulating independent attorneys and adoption brokers, and
the greater risk of illegal or unethical activity, necessitates that all foreign
adoptions take place through established agencies.80 A ban on non-agency
adoptions would prevent abuses and improve the image of the process.
First, agency licensing by a U.S. state usually requires that the agency
take on the state's goal of fostering the best interest of the child.81 Even
without state supervision, an agency agenda is more likely to comport with the
child's best interest than the agenda of a for-profit intermediary. 2 At least
one for-profit agency has coordinated domestic adoptions. 3  While in
business, the Southwest Adoption Center in Scottsdale, Arizona, charged a
maximum $24,500 fee, payable in advance. The agency grew into a $3.5
million dollar business. According to one newspaper report, this agency
achieved high standards of care for the birth mother and the prospective
parents, including having adoptive parents follow a birth mother through the
78 McMillan, supra note 13, at n. 21.
79 For the purposes of this article, private or independent adoptions refer to adoptions not
handled by an adoption agency. Agencies should be licensed in both the sending country and
receiving U.S. state.
80 Hester, supra note 3, at n. 7.
81 Liu, supra note 24, at n. 105.
82 Selmann, supra note 42, at 851.
83Lisa Gubemick, How Much is That Baby in the Window?, FoRBES, Oct. 14, 1991, at 90.
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process before beginning to arrange an adoption themselves.84 However, most
international adoption agencies are nonprofit, and allowing for-profit agencies
to participate could easily damage the reputation of ICAs.
Second, agencies are more likely to find the best home for a given
child because they often consider a variety of alternative placements, such as
foster homes."5 The agencies are not limited by the single-minded quest for an
adoption that characterizes private adoption brokers. Agencies can also
match a variety of children with a group of prospective parents, increasing
their ability to serve the best interests of all concerned.86
Third, agencies can accept custody of the child before placement in
the United States. 7 Agency custody allows the child to be cleared for
adoption abroad, and then matched with prospective parents. If the parents
reconsider or are found unsuitable, the agency can find another set of parents
without repeating the in-country adoption process or sending the child back to
his or her native country.
Fourth, limiting ICAs to licensed agencies with a presence in both the
sending and receiving countries will allow the sending countries to have a
sense of accountability when a child leaves their country.88 Ecuador, for
example, requires that foreign adoptive parents appoint an Ecuadorian agent
84 Id.
85 The Hague Convention's treatment of alternative placement would be difficult to
implement. Under the Convention, an ICA is appropriate only "if the competent authorities of
the State of origin have determined, after possibilities for placement of the child within the State
of origin have been given due consideration, that an intercountry adoption is in the child's best
interests." Hague Convention, Art. 4(b), supra note 62, at 32 I.L.M. 1139. The Convention
does not describe how this standard should be applied. For instance, what if a father with a
history of alcoholism wants to adopt a child from his country, but a stable foreign couple is also
available? Does the Hague Convention imply that the least desirable alternative is always
leaving one's native country?
Rather than the Hague Convention approach, simply banning non-agency adoptions will
increase the chance that alternatives will be considered. Returning to the alcoholic father
hypothetical, an adoption agency operating in both countries would be more likely to consider
relative placements than the private brokers allowed under the Hague Convention.
Further, the INS could add a requirement that an ICA petition contain an evaluation of the
possibilities for alternative placement However, such a requirement should explicitly recognize
the limitations of such a subjective evaluation.86 Liu, supra note 24, at 200.
87 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b). Cf Australia, which allows children to enter the country under the
custody of the Immigration Ministry for purposes of adoption. Ross L. Anderson, International
Adoption, In INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE LAw IN AUSTRALiA 93 (1991).
88For example, the Australian government endorsed this proposal in 1986, in a major policy
statement by the Council of Social Welfare Ministers and the Minister of Immigration and
Ethnic Affairs. Id. at 99.
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who must be available to answer questions about the validity of the adoption
for five years.s9 Similarly, the government of Colombia has entered into a
contract with New Partners, Inc., a U.S.-based adoption agency, to operate an
orphanage in that country.9" By having a presence in the sending country,
New Partners has the opportunity to develop direct and lasting ties with
Colombian officials.9' The development of a committed relationship between
the agency and the sending country should increase trust in the ICA process.
One narrow exception to the non-agency ban should be recog-
nized-adoption of a niece, nephew, or grandchild of the adoptive parent.
The INS, and particularly the Board of Immigration Appeals, carefully
scrutinizes these adoptions in order to insure that the process is not a ruse to
circumvent immigration laws.9" The system in Japan can be regarded as an
example for how this exception can be effectuated. The Japanese government
does not have a formal ICA program because it sees little danger of abuse
since 92.8% of its foreign adoptions involve close relatives.9 3 There is no
relevant statute on ICAs in Japan, and the entire process is guided by ambigu-
ous standards based on public policy.94 Judging from the Japanese experi-
ence, it is much less likely that a close relative adoption will lead to a situation
of abuse. Further, the prospective parents may save substantial amounts of
money by pursuing the ICA themselves.
Beyond the relatively rare case of adoption of a close relative (in
countries other than Japan), agency adoptions provide greater safeguards for
all concerned. The experience of many sending and receiving countries
supports a ban on non-agency adoptions. Most receiving countries have
already limited ICAs to either licensed agencies or to government-sponsored
89 Liu, supra note 24, at 204. Similarly, Brazil uses a particular nonprofit agency, LIMIAR -
USA, Inc., to facilitate ICAs. Bowen, supra note 21, at 73. LIMIAR collects and authenticates
documents for the Brazilian government, and coordinates the required three post-placement
reports. Id. at 78.
9o Anna Borgnan, Adoptions Abroad Mix Highs, Lows, WASH. POST, Jan. 8, 1995, at B3.
91 As a final example, South Korea requires that all ICAs be processed by four Korean
adoption agencies. Korea Eases Way for Foreign Adoption, But End Near, LOS ANGELES
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1994, at 2. Each of these agencies works with no more than one agency in
each U.S. state, creating a predictable system with virtually no room for the corruption reported
in other countries.
92 Padilla, supra note 22, at 838; Higgs v. Attorney General, Civil Action No. 89-1099 (TPJ)
(D.D.C. Nov. 6, 1991), reprinted in BENDER'S IMMIGR. CASE REP. A3-20.
93 Junichi Akiba, International Adoption in JAPANESE REPORTS FOR THE 13TH
INTERNATIONAL CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 67, 75, 77 (1991).
94 Id. at 75.
[Vol.5:33
REFORMING INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION PROCEDURES
Central Authority.95 Holland, for example, has banned non-agency adoptions,
and requires that all agencies be licensed, non-profit, and based in Holland.96
Finland has gone even further by creating an expert government panel that
approves contact with foreign adoption agencies or governments in order to
protect against unethical activity.97
Sending countries also seem to prefer dealing only with adoption
agencies. While a few Latin American countries favor non-agency adoptions,
many countries have already moved to limit ICAs to licensed agencies.98 For
example, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has limited ICAs to the
Chinese Central Authority, called the China Center for Adoption Affairs, and
agencies licensed by the receiving state. Similarly, Russia-by far the largest
sending country in Europe--has begun to develop new procedures for
licensing foreign adoption agencies.99
The United States has thus far declined to place a ban on non-agency
adoptions, despite the many reasons to support it and the number of countries
endorsing such a ban.' At the Hague Convention in 1993, the U.S. resisted
an international ban on independent adoptions. Recently, the INS reiterated
its determination to preserve non-agency adoptions in the comments to its
amended regulations.'
Why does the United States continue to support non-agency ICAs?
Some observers contend that private intermediaries are here to stay, and are
"essentially a fact of life."'0 2 Prospective U.S. parents, desperate to start a
family, have increasingly sought out private intermediaries who claim they can
95 Eri Jayme, InternationalAdoption in German Law in GERMAN NATIONAL REPORTS IN
CwILLAWMATrERSFORTHEXIIITH CONGRESS OF COMPARATIVE LAW 13, 14 (1990).96 Kokini-Iatridou, supra note 75, at 104.
97 Kaarina Buure-Hagglund, International Adoption in FINNISH NATIONAL REPORTS TO THE
13THCONGRESS OFTHE INTERNATIONAL ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE LAW 35, 38,45 (1990).98 Liu, supra note 24, at n.105. With non-agency adoptions in South and Central America
generally, prospective parents must initiate contact directly with orphanages or biological
parents. Bisignaro, supra note 4, at 126.
99 INS, State Dept. Instructs on New Russian Adoption Law, 72 INTERPRETER RELEASES
332 (Mar. 6, 1995).100 Liu, supra note 24, at n.176.
'0' 59 Fed. Reg. 38,878 (1994). The closest the INS has come to endorsing agency
adoptions is in its instructions to Form 1-600, which encourage petitioners to take advantage of
the services of a recognized child welfare placement agency. Charles Gordon et al., Immigration
Law and Procedure § 41.02[1][a] (1994) [hereinafter "Immigration Law and Procedure"]. See
also Pfund, supra note 66, at 60-63 for a discussion of the debate over non-agency adoptions
at the Hague Convention negotiations.
102 Kennard, supra note 66, at 648.
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do a better, fasterjob. However, this claim is clearly false, as many countries
have eliminated non-agency adoptions while maintaining active and effective
ICA systems. Also, the danger of negative publicity hindering ICAs out-
weighs any potential increase in speed. As one author wrote of the 1990 ban
on private ICAs in Colombia, "[t]hough working through a bureaucracy
makes the adoption more cumbersome and slower, it removes the profit
incentive from private attorneys and baby-brokers, and makes the process
safer for the adopting family."'013
ii) Regulate adoption costs. One of the most damaging charges
against ICAs is baby-selling. Indigent biological parents may be tempted to
ask for money from wealthier U.S. citizens, and adopting parents may be
willing to spend large amounts to create a family. One way to address this
potential abuse is to remove the financial incentive from intermediaries, as
most U.S. states have done.10 4
Currently, the INS has no restrictions on adoption costs, which is
striking considering that a standard ICA can run well over $10,000.105
Domestic adoption programs have two important lessons to offer. First,
courts directly monitor costs in most states by requiring that all private
adoption contracts proceed only with judicial approval. 0 6 Second, in most
states, any money paid beyond "direct costs" is illegal and punishable as
against public policy.0 7 Similar policies are essential for ICAs.
Clearly, the most difficult part of the process is determining reason-
able direct costs, as opposed to gratuitous payments. Once again, the INS can
learn from the states, which have developed workable guidelines. Direct costs
can include medical and lying-in expenses for the biological mother, legal
103 McMillan, supra note 13, at 142. A similar view has been expressed about the Canadian
system: "There are probably very few Canadians who are potentially unfit as parents who
would go to the trouble and expense of adopting a child overseas. It is the danger of even one
case of abuse arising that, unfortunately, justifies the existence of red tape that binds formal
adoption procedures for everyone else." Bowen, supra note 21, at 3.
S04See generally, Kennard, supra note 66, at 637-39.
105 For example, a brochure from the Datz Foundation, a non-profit adoption agency, lists
the following rough costs for a standard ICA from China: donation to orphanage - $3,500; Datz
Foundation fee - S4,000; local fees to Ministry of Justice, etc. - $850; passport for child - $100;
local facilitator fee - S500-3,000; visa fee at U.S. consulate - $200; translation fees - $500;
medical report and photo - $25; travel within China - $300; round-trip airfare to China - $1,500.
The total, depending on the local facilitator's fee, runs from $11,475 to $13,975.
106 2 AM. JUR. 2DAdoption § 43 (1994).
107 See e.g., In re Adoption of Kindgren, 540 N.E.2d 485 (IIl. 1989).
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fees, and court costs. There is a substantial body of case'law defining each of
these. 8 The Uniform Adoption Act goes further by requiring a full account-
ing of all adoption-related expenses. 9 Noncompliance with thses rules can
lead to the imposition of heavy fines or jail terms." 0 Further, the enforcement
process can be simplified by a ban on non-agency intermediaries.
Looking abroad, many receiving countries also bar gratuitous
payments. Unaccounted payments for adoptions are illegal in most of Europe.
Similarly, Israel will invalidate an adoption that has proceeded by improper
payments, unless such strong ties have developed with the adoptive parents
that the child's welfare would be threatened by separation."'
Why then does the United States not impose a similar ban on finan-
cial incentives for ICAs? The rationale seems to be that the INS relies on the
states and on stringent consent requirements by the biological parent(s) to
insure the integrity of the process. However, this reliance is untenable for at
least three reasons. First, approximately half of the states will accept a
foreign adoption decree based on comity without its own review of the
circumstances."' Second, state officials may have difficulty in evaluating the
extent and reasonableness of payments made abroad. Third, states often do
not regulate or even license intermediaries who simply "advise," rather than
place directly." 3 For these reasons, the INS should institute a system of
accounting whereby all adoption expenses are documented and submitted to
the Service. Expenses that significantly exceed the average for a given
country should trigger closer scrutiny."'
108 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption § 48 (1994).
109 Unif Adoption Act § 10, 9 U.L.A. 45 (1988).
"0 State v. Clark, 16 Kan. App. 2d 552, 826 P. 2d 925 (1992) (describing felony crime of
intentionally and knowingly receiving excessive fees in connection with an adoption). In New
Jersey, violation of a similar law (allowing only fees to an approved nonprofit agency and certain
childbirth expenses) is a high misdemeanor punishable by 3-5 years in prison. In re Baby M,
537 A.2d 1227, 1240-41 (N.J. 1988).
111 Buure-Hagglund, supra note 97, at 35; Shifinan, supra note 76, at 35,42.112 McMillan,supra note 13, at n.106.
113 Joel Thurtell, Some Blame Lawyers in Costly East Bloc Adoptions, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Oct. 13, 1991, at IF.
114 The INS should be required to maintain basic records on the costs incurred for various
types of expenses in each sending country. A simple computer program could keep these
records. An ICA that exceeds the average cost for a given country would not result in a
violation, but rather would flag the case for further investigation. As described infra, U.S. states
have well-established programs for evaluating adoption costs, and ICAs flagged by the INS
could be referred to the appropriate state official for review and possible prosecution.
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One might argue that illegal payments could still be made abroad and
then left out of accountings submitted to the INS. However, the dangerous
consequences of a rumor of baby-selling make it necessary that the INS have
at least a basic program to monitor costs. Furthermore, civil and criminal
penalties for violations will provide an added incentive to comply, while
limiting intermediaries to licensed agencies will increase the likelihood of
compliance. 115
iii) Impose penalties for violations. The INS should impose penalties
for violations. In spite of the benefits that penalties would engender, the INS
has explicitly resisted this position. For example, the INS specifically rejected
the possibility of monitoring home study preparers in its October, 1994
regulations." 6 The INS does not keep track of the quality of home studies
written by a given individual or agency. Further, it will not deny validity to a
home study merely because its author has consistently submitted shabby or
fraudulent work." 7 The Service has also decided not to require home study
preparers to submit their reports under penalty of perjury because, "the
proceeding is between the prospective adoptive parents and the INS only.""l1 8
In deferring to the states on the enforcement of home study quality, the
Service creates no disincentive for abusing the system." 9
In contrast, many other countries have enacted sanctions for violation
of ICA laws. For example, Sri Lanka imposes a maximum 20 year sentence
for giving consideration for an adoption. 20 Similarly, Romania has reacted to
widespread abuse of its adoption system with a stiff one to five year prison
term for violating the new state adoption law.' 2' These regulations strongly
deter abuse of the ICA system.
Similarly, many U.S. states impose stiff penalties for buying and
selling children. 22 Louisiana, for example, imposes a fine of $5,000 and/or
115 In addition, while the INS cannot monitor every payment, the press will often be looking
for violations, and a media report could also serve as a trigger for an investigation and possible
prosecution.
116 A home study is an examination of the environment that the prospective parents can
provide for the child. It usually includes interviews, visits and background checks.
117 59 Fed. Reg. at 37,789 (1994).
118 Id. at 38,880.
"
9 Id. at 38,879.
120 Tough Laws To Prevent Child Trafficking in Sri Lanka, XINHUA NEWS (People's
Republic of China), Apr. 19, 1994; Buure-Hagglund, supra note 97, at 42.
121 McMillan, supra note 13, at 144.
122 Gubernick, supra note 83, at 92.
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five years in jail for selling minors.' The INS could take advantage of these
state laws by reporting suspicions of baby-selling to the states for possible
prosecution.
However, even if states are able to monitor baby-selling, there is no
danger in being overcautious in an environment where even a single incident
of baby-selling could halt adoptions from an entire country. As one commen-
tator has noted, the "Third World alone will never be in a position to eradicate
abusive practices as long as industrial countries both allow prospectiVe
adoptive parents to act on their own, and close one or both eyes to gross
violations of children's rights."'24 Perhaps we have opened one eye as far as
state practices, however, the danger of abuse requires the INS to open the
other eye by instituting federal penalties.
iv) Institute a 'best interest inquiry' in conjunction with INS rules.
One might argue that the INS rules currently err on the safe side by limiting
visa issuance to a narrowly defined orphan class, and that a broader definition
could allow abuses."z Under current law, however, there is a defacto system
of trumping INS rules--members of Congress and Senators have been rather
willing to intercede in a stalled adoption. 26 Elected representatives are often
drawn to adoption cases for personal and political reasons. Rather than
leaving the ICA process open to such behind-the-scenes activity, it would be
safer to create a formal method of injecting equity into the process. The
traditional family law test-the "best interest of the child"--could be used as
a model for adjudicating difficult or borderline ICA cases.
A best interest evaluation could be made by any party, such as a
prospective parent who has technically violated the rules but has already
"3 La. Rev. Stat § 14"286(D) (West 1994). See also Matter of Adoption of a Child by N.P.,
398 A.2d 937,940 (NJ. 1979) (adoptive parents found guilty of criminal violation for evasion
of adoption law by using unauthorized intermediary and making illegal payments to secure
adoption of Chilean baby); Hester, supra note 3, at 1274 n.17.
1 Marie-Francoise Lucker-Babel, Intercountry Adoption and Trafficking in Children: An
Initial Assessment of the Adequacy of the International Protection of Children and Their
Rights, 62 INT'LREv. PENALL. 799, 815 (1991).
25 For example, a recent article on the adoption of children from Hong Kong to the United
Kingdom expressed concern that a best interest inquiry could become a way to avoid formal
immigration requirements. Elizabeth Phillips, Adoption, 16 HONG KONG L. J. 393 (1986). The
current state of British ICA law is that "best interest' can outweigh any other single factor, but
not all other factors combined. Id. at 394 n.17.
126 Telephone Interview with Mark Eckman, Staff Attorney, Datz Foundation (Feb. 7,
1995).
1995]
56 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
bonded with the child, or an uncle of the child who alleges that a private
lawyer has paid the biological parents for their consent to the adoption. The
evaluation should spell out clearly why the INS decision should be trumped
and what the competing factors are.'27 In practice, best interest would likely
be invoked by the prospective parents, the adoption agency, or a state official.
To be truly equitable, a "best interest trump" should be available both to
support an adoption and to oppose one.
Since the child and natural parents are rarely in a position to make a
sophisticated challenge to stop an adoption, the INS should take a further step
toward state family law and institute a system of legal guardians for the child.
A "law guardian" or its equivalent represents the point of view of the child. 12
Thus, if there were a concern about baby-selling or a delicate question of
balancing the child's interests in a complex situation, the best interest of the
child would be better protected.
Many U.S. states provide for the appointment of law guardians (or
the equivalent) when the adoptive parents' interests are significantly different
from those of the child. In New York State, a law guardian must be appointed
in foster child adoptions where consent is opposed or if the child is not placed
within six months.'29 In addition, a Family Court judge may, on her own
motion, appoint a law guardian for a child at any point. 3° This type of system
would work well in the context of ICAs.
As a further example, Germany appoints a law guardian for foreign
adoptees for just this reason. 3' The INS could choose to employ a small
corps of law guardians on staff to monitor ICAs. They would have an
advantage over regular INS personnel since they would specialize in ICAs.
However, the cost and start-up time of such a program make it unlikely.
Rather, states could be encouraged to appoint law guardians for foreign
adoptees, with the INS supplying information on the native country that the
average U.S. law guardian would not have.
127 Courts have attempted to implement the "best interest test" through a balancing of such
factors as continuity of residence, prospective parents' financial status, history and ability to
provide a nurturing environment. Selmann, supra note 42, at 843-44.
128 Joseph R. Carrieri, The Foster Child 1989: From Abandonment to Adoption, in
PRACTCING LAW INSTITUTE LITIGATION AND ADMINISTRATIVE PRACTICE COURSE HANDBOOK
SERIES 111 (1989).129 N.Y. Fam. Ct. Act § 249(a) (1994).
130 Id.
131 Jayme, supra note 95, at 20.
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Even if the INS does not choose to add the cost of appointing law
guardians, there is still a place for the best interest trump in ICAs. In Ger-
many, for example, the best interest of the child can supersede the default rule
of deferring to the adoption laws of the child's native country.132 This might
occur in a situation where the child's biological mother would be endangered
by a local requirement that she legally abandon the child in open court. 33
Similarly, Holland permits exceptions to the requirement that no more than 40
years of age separate the child and prospective parents, if it is in the best
interest of the child. 134 Once again, this type of best interest analysis would
be well-suited to the INS program.
An article on adoption by the Dean of the University of Pretoria Law
School praised the U.S. best interest test for domestic adoption as providing
flexibility in light of changing social and political situations.135 He argued
that South Africa needs flexibility to adjust to uncertainty about reactions to
interracial adoptions. Similarly, the United States also needs flexibility in
ICAs to deal with rapidly changing social, political and economic conditions
in the sending countries, and to avoid overly rigid reliance on wooden rules.
136
With many competing interests in an ICA, the INS should give weight to
claims that the Service values the child's best interest by actually setting up a
mechanism for looking through the child's eyes in tough cases.
v) Require Physical Exams of Adoptees. The fear of immigrants
carrying disease into the United States also threatens the reputation of the ICA
program. Like the charges of baby-selling, reports of diseases could easily
explode in the media and threaten domestic support for ICAs. For example,
a recent New England Journal of Medicine study found that 73% of foreign
adoptees had infectious diseases, many of which are not detected by a regular
physical examination.'37 Many of those with infectious diseases suffered from
112Id. at 19.
13 3 Id. at 20.
134 Kokkini-Iatridou, supra note 75, at 102.
131 D. j. Joubert, Interracial Adoptions: Can We Learn from the Americans?, 110 S. APR.
L. J. 726 (1993).
136 See also, McMillan, supra note 13, at 162. Referring to the Hague Convention's public
policy exception, similar to a best interest trump, the author wrote that "a rule of absolute
recognition could have been used by unscrupulous individuals to undermine some of the
protections the Convention sought to ensure." See generally, Stacie L Strong, Children's
Rights in Intercountry Adoption: Towards a New Goal, in 13 B.U. INT'L L.J. 163 (1995).
'17 Children Adopted Abroad Have Undetected Diseases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 15, 1991, at
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intestinal parasites, which are not a major health hazard in this country.
However, the study provoked an article in the Wall Street Journal advocating
better screening of adoptees for diseases.
All adult applicants for legalization or adjustment must undergo a
physical examination for gonorrhea, granuloma inguinale, infectious leprosy,
HIV, lymphogranuloma, infectious-stage syphilis, and active tuberculosis.
3
The INS could relatively easily extend this requirement to include foreign
adoptees under the age of 15, perhaps excluding diseases not common in
children. The INS identifies U.S. Public Health Service and local doctors
abroad who perform the medical examination for adults, so an infrastructure
is already in place. 139 In addition to assuaging public concerns about adoptees
carrying diseases to the United States, physical exams in the home country
could encourage early treatment of other ailments.
c. How To Increase the Number of ICAs.
Just as the INS must work to prevent abuses to preserve the trust of
the sending countries, it must also speed up the process to meet the needs of
children and parents. These twin goals may be difficult to reconcile, and
efforts to expedite the ICA process should be weighed against the danger of
abuse of the system. The adoption of one of the following three proposals
would likely increase the number of ICAs: 1) Create a new visa category of
"adoptee" in the INA; 2) Expand the role of the federal government in
collecting and disseminating information on policies and conditions in sending
countries; and 3) Require state preprocessing of all prospective parents. 40
i) Create a new visa category of "adoptee." Unlike the true orphans
who came to the United States after World War II, many children today arrive
138 INA § 212(g); 22 C.F.R. § 42.66; 42 C.F.R. § 34.2(b); Immigration Law and Procedure,
supra note 101, at § 51.06(2)(d)(ii).
139 8 C.F.R. § 234.2(a).
140 There is a another very simple way to improve the efficiency of the ICA process: require
that adoption-related governmental correspondence from consulates overseas be sent by fax or
other expeditious means. Eckman Interview, supra note 2. The consular officer is the first line
of review for the 1-600 petition for classification as an orphan, which can either be approved or
forwarded. 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(k)(2). Often when a petition has not been approved, it is
forwarded to an overseas Service office by surface mail, potentially causing serious delays. Id.
at 204.3(h)(1 1). Costs of sending the documents should be charged to the prospective parents,
for whom the charge will be relatively small since the standard ICA costs over $10,000.
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as adoptees-they are given up for adoption rather than being parentless.
Yet, the INA requires these children to fit into the orphan definition in order
to obtain a visa. Adherence to the orphan definition makes the INS a potential
bottleneck in an intercountry adoption.
For example, the INS does not recognize the "relinquishment or
release by the parents to the prospective adoptive parents or for a specific
adoption" as abandonment which would confer orphan status.' Under this
definition of orphan, the Service would not approve an orphan visa for a child
whom both biological parents want to grow up in the United States.'42
Similarly, the INS limits release for adoption to a "sole or surviving parent
[who] is incapable of providing the proper care."'43 As such, a single mother
cannot release her child for adoption in the United State unless she is "unable
to meet the child's basic needs."'" Current U.S. law does not allow these
children to qualify as orphans even if an American couple is ready to take the
child and the resulting adoption is valid in both the U.S. state and the foreign
country. 14 Creating a new category for "adoptees" would allow the Service
to get around these artificial restrictions and to increase the number of
children eligible for ICAs.'
As a practical matter, this change has already begun with the expand-
ing definition of orphan over the past half-century. For example, the Board of
Immigration Appeals (BIA) has held that a biological father can "construc-
tively" abrogate parental rights to make a child an eligible orphan under INA
Section 101(b)(1)(F).'47 In a similar expansion of definitions, the INS
allowed a grandmother to adopt where the mother could not support the child
financially and the father was deceased. The most recent ICA regulations
include an even broader conception of orphan through expanded definitions of
"desertion by both parents," "disappearance of both parents," "incapable of
providing proper care," "loss of both parents," and "separation from both
14 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b).
142 59 Fed. Reg. 38,878 (1994).
14' 8 U.S.C. § 1 101(b)(1)(F) (1994).
144 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(b).14 5 Padilla, supra note 22, at n.174.
146 Pfund, supra note 66, at 71.
147 In re Naome Melendez, No. A27-260-666 (BIA Aug. 13, 1992), reprinted in 10 Immig.
Rptr. B 1-99 (constructive abrogation by natural father made natural mother sole parent under
INS regulations).
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parents. '148 However, these improvements still needlessly restrict ICAs to the
orphan definition.
If the INS decides to keep the useful but restrictive orphan definition,
the INA could still be amended to add a new category of adoptee as follows:
A child, under the age of sixteen at the time the petition is filed in his or her
behalf to accord a classification as an immediate relative under section
1151 (b) of this title, who is an adoptee as a result of an irrevocable written
release by both parents of the child, or by the single or surviving parent, to a
nonprofit adoption agency recognized in the foreign sending country.
Further, definitions of key terms could be provided in the INS
regulations:
(1) Irrevocable written release: a document written
in both the parents' native language and in English, which
states clearly that the child is being released for emigration
and adoption in the United States, that the parent or parents
have received counseling on their decision by a representa-
tive of the adoption agency, and that the release is irrevoca-
ble from the time of signing the release. The release must be
signed by the parent or parents and witnesses. A separate
statement signed by a representative of the adoption agency
on penalty of perjury must accompany the irrevocable writ-
ten release attesting that the agency has provided counseling
for the parent or parents and that to the best of his or her
knowledge the release complies with applicable U.S. state
law, INS regulations, and the laws of the foreign sending
country.
(2) Nonprofit adoption agency: an agency licensed
to perform adoptions in at least one U.S. state and recog-
nized by a competent authority in the foreign sending coun-
try in accordance with the laws of that country. The agency
must operate on a nonprofit basis, and must specifically
comply with any laws or regulations of the foreign sending
148 59 Fed. Reg. 38,877 (1994).
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country regarding organizations that can handle intercountry
adoptions.
(3) Single parent: the child's parent when the other
biological parent has permanently abandoned the child,
deserted the child, or disappeared.
(4) Survivin parent: the child's living parent when
the child's other parent is deceased, and the child has not
acquired another parent within the meaning of section
101(b)(2) of the Act.
Note that this proposed definition of adoptee protects the parents and
the child by requiring counseling before signing the release, limiting ICAs to
licensed nonprofit agencies, requiring the agency representative to attest to the
validity of the consent to the extent of the representative's knowledge on
penalty of perjury, and by requiring compliance with U.S. state and foreign
sending country laws. The definition also offers the advantage of not forcing
the parents to engage in the fiction of classifying the child as an orphan.
While the Department of Justice continues to believe that the
"definition of orphan guards against the splitting of intact, functioning foreign
families," that definition did not stop large scale baby-selling in Romania in
the last several years. 4 9 An artificial and illusory definition of "orphan" is
not effective and will keep many children from being adopted in the United
States. New controls, as described above, need to be implemented to protect
foreign children and families.
ii) Require the Federal government to expand its role as an
information source. Most European countries and the Hague Convention have
endorsed the idea of a central repository of ICA information. The INS should
follow suit by expanding the federal government as a source of information on
adoption conditions worldwide. Up-to-date information on a sending
country's policies and social situation enable prospective parents to better
navigate the waters of foreign adoption. 5 This is particularly true since busy
149 Padilla, supra note 22, at 838.
150 Gaudemet-Tallonsupra note 17, at 570. A review of ICAs in France stressed the
importance of good information in expediting the process. Id.
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"front line" consular officers or INS personnel may not have up-to-date
information. 5
The obvious choice for a source of information in the United States
is the agency that has already begun to fill this role: the Office of Citizen
Consular Services (CCS) at the State Department. Currently, CCS monitors
information abroad that would be of interest to U.S. citizens. In the adoption
context, CCS issues bulletins to the INS describing significant developments
in sending countries and maintains a telephone recording on adoption
conditions worldwide. For example, in 1993, CCS offered to contact all
prospective U.S. parents seeking to adopt from the PRC when the agency
learned that a moratorium on ICAs there might cause immigration papers to
expire. 5
2
To date, CCS information has been limited to major negative effects
on the ICA process. In addition, the information provided by CCS tends to be
conservative, so that agencies are sometimes forced to rely on their own
contacts abroad for accurate information." 3 CCS bulletins could be relatively
easily expanded to include policy changes in sending countries. Then, either
CCS or the INS could inform all licensed agencies (not a prohibitively large
number). The INS should also keep a mailing list of these agencies and allow
each agency to submit information or experiences that might be useful to the
others, including information from their own contacts. This process could
take many forms, such as an informal newsletter or computer bulletin board
service.
Disseminating information will increase the ability of an agency to
process ICAs. It will also facilitate adoption from lesser-known sending
countries to reduce adoption "stampedes" from the few well-publicized
countries. 54 A federal information source would also help state officials and
151 Such a situation has been observed in Canada, where the accuracy and consistency of
information on adoption conditions worldwide seems to improve as one goes up the immigration
hierarchy. Bowen, supra note 21, at 38.
152 INS Provides Guidance on Updating China Adoption Applications, 70 INTERPRETER
RELEASES 47 (Dec. 13, 1993).153 Eckman Interview, supra note 2.
154 For example, news reports in the United States about the shocking conditions in
Romanian orphanages led to one such adoption stampede. See note 34 supra. The resulting
abuses eventually led the Romanian government to crack down on adoptions.
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adoption agencies understand the rules of countries that do not have well-
functioning legal systems or that rely on customary law (rather than positive
law) for adoptions.'55
iii) Require state preprocessing of prospective parent(s). The INS
should require state preprocessing before moving forward on the ICA
application (Form 1-600 or I-600A). 5 6  Thus, states would evaluate
prospective parents through a home study, interview and background check.
Currently, only a few states have formal preprocessing procedures for ICAs,
and the INS requires compliance with them where they exist. 7 Universal
preprocessing would speed the ICA process by: 1) providing adoption
agencies with the ability to tell foreign governments that prospective parents
have been carefully checked by their state; 2) expediting readoption
proceedings after the child comes to the United States;'58 and 3) avoiding the
difficulty of having INS preprocessing expire while waiting for an adoption.
For instance, one author argues that mandatory re-adoption in the
U.S. state creates an unnecessary hurdle for adoptive parents.s 9 However,
since most of the expense and aggravation in ICAs comes from the adoption
process in the sending country, minimal U.S. preprocessing and re-adoption
155 Hester, supra note 3, at 128 1. Some countries treat adoptions as a non-legal process that
is done by custom, unlike the United States, which is highly formalistic and based on positive,
written law and policies. See, e.g., Matter of Khatoon, 19 I. & N. Dec. 153 (BIA July 31,
1984), reprinted in 1 Immig. Rptr. B1-143 (Muslim adoption in India not recognized because
statutory law of India does not recognize adoption); Kaho v. llchert, 765 F.2d 877 (9th Cir.
1985) (customary adoption in Tonga recognized by INS because sufficient legal status created).
State agencies may have difficulty in evaluating the validity of a customary adoption, even if it
is fllly recognized in the sending country.
156 The requirement ofpreprocessing might not be terribly burdensome. First, state adoption
procedures are well-developed. Second, many receiving countries require readoption once the
child enters the country, See e.g., Jayme, supra note 95, at 16.
157 8 C.F.R. § 204.3(d)(1)(iv)(B)(3). New York, for example, requires proof of consent by
the biological parents and compliance with the laws of the sending country beyond just a foreign
adoption decree. N.Y. Dom. Rel. § 1l15a.1 (1994). See also Bartholet, supra note 55, at
§ 11.04(2)(b).
158 This is particularly important since a state court may not recognize an ICA if the court
feels that it took place without proper due process. Bartholet, supra note 55, at § 11.04(4).
Also, in some states, failure to comply with preprocessing requirements can result in a waiting
period before finalizing the adoption in state court. Id. at § 11.04(2)(a). Thus, the child would
not have the benefits of being legally part of his or her adoptive family (such as inheritance
rights, etc.) for a period of time.
159 "The necessity of adopting the same child twice, once in each country, creates an
exhausting, expensive and aggravating procedure." Bisignaro, supra note 4, at 126.
1995]
64 CORNELL JOURNAL OF LAW AND PUBLIC POLICY
requirements should add little extra difficulty. In addition, as discussed
above, many sending countries do not have a well-functioning legal system,
making careful inquiry in the United States a necessary guard against abuses.
The federal government should pressure all states to institute
preprocessing requirements. This could easily be done by offering funding or
exemption from current INS preprocessing rules if a state submits an
approved program for foreign adoptions. For example, the Child Abuse
Prevention and Treatment and Adoption Reform Act provides federal funds
to states that have approved programs for adoption of children in foster
homes. 6 ' Similarly, the federal government successfully linked continued
highway funds to state enactment of a drinking age of 2 1.161 INS funds for the
states could come out of the money it saves from streamlining its own role,
and states would have an added incentive to participate because it would give
them more control over the process.
The INS could drop its own home study requirements in favor of state
preprocessing. 162 Among the main reasons for the INS to reject prospective
parents are: sporadic employment record; appearance on the welfare rolls;
arrest or conviction; late rent payments; and difficulty in caring for their own
children.'63 These factors could just as easily (if not better) be evaluated by
state officials experienced in family law and geographically closer to the
records needed. 164 Deferring to state preprocessing would make the ICA
system more efficient and allow more adoptions to take place.
V. CONCLUSION
Demographics favor intercountry adoption. There are tens of
thousands of parents seeking to adopt and millions of children without
6
'42 U.S.C. §§ 511 l(b)(1) (1988). See e.g., 60 Fed. Reg. 18,107 (1995) (Department of
Health and Human Services will provide money to states under the Act for demonstration
programs that encourage adoptions by minority families, or of children in foster homes or
children with special needs).
161 Surface Transportation Assistance Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 98-363 §§ 6-7, 98 Stat. 435,
437-39 (codified at 23 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1988)) (Secretary of Transportation can withhold part
of federal highway funds to states that have not raised their drinking age to 21).
162 Hester, supra note 3, at 1271.
163 id.164 McMillan, supra note 13, at 159.
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families, yet bureaucratic red tape forces ICAs to stagnate at low levels and
sending countries increasingly close their doors out of fear of abuse of the
system. Meeting the needs of future prospective parents and children will
require 1) making the INS process faster and easier and 2) taking steps to
assure sending countries that the process is safe.
These twin goals are not incompatible. Abandoning the INA's
restrictive orphan definition for a broader category of "adoptees" will allow
more children to enter the United States. In addition, by building on
established strengths of each level of government, the efficiency of ICAs can
be increased. Specifically, the federal government should expand its role as
an information source on adoption-related conditions worldwide and allow
states to play a greater role in evaluating prospective parents.
To bolster the sagging reputation of the ICA system, the Service
should require that all foreign adoptions be processed by licensed non-profit
agencies, that no money change hands beyond documented costs, and that stiff
penalties be imposed for the rare instances of baby-selling. Furthermore, the
ad hoc process of enlisting the aid of elected representatives to challenge
adverse adoption decisions should be replaced by a formal review mechanism
for tough cases based on the established "best interest of the child" test.
The United States has nearly a century of experience at the state level
in policing and processing adoptions on which to base reform of its ICA
system. By cracking down on abuses and mproving processing efficiency,
the INS has the opportunity to reverse current trends against foreign adoptions
and help to meet the needs of prospective parents and children worldwide.
Dan Berger
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